Department of Family and Medical Leave Releases 2023 PFML Workforce Notifications

The Massachusetts Department of Family and Medical Leave (“Department”) recently published its 2023 workforce notifications. These notifications, required under the Paid Family and Medical Leave Act (“PFML”) include a poster, notices, and rate sheets that employers are to post or distribute. Massachusetts employers (excluding individual and public employers who have not adopted the PFML) are required to distribute the notices to employees and display the poster by December 2, 2022, which is 30 days before the new PFML rates take effect. Downloadable versions of the 2023 workplace poster, rate sheets, and notices are available on the Department’s website, here.

Massachusetts employers with a workforce eligible for PFML benefits must display the 2023 workplace poster, which explains PFML benefits, in a workplace location where it can be easily read. The poster must be available in English and each language which is the primary language of 5 or more individuals in an employer’s workforce if that language is one of the 12 translations available from the Department’s website. Employers should continue to display the 2022 poster until the end of the year, while also displaying the 2023 poster to notify employees of the upcoming rate changes. It also a best practice to distribute an electronic version of the poster so that employees may still access it in the event that they work remotely or otherwise do not enter the physical work location.

Additionally, employers must distribute the applicable 2023 PFML notice to all employees and covered contract workers. There are three versions of the notice: (1)  for employers with 25 or more covered individuals; (2) for employers with fewer than 25 covered individuals; and (3) for employers to provide self-employed individuals working on a Form 1099-MISC. As with the poster, the notice must be in English and any other language that is the primary language of 5 or more individuals.

Finally, employers must distribute the new rate sheets, which include the 2023 contribution rates for PFML benefits. These rate sheets also vary by employer size. For employers with 25 or more covered individuals, the family leave contribution rate for 2023 is 0.11%, and the Medical Leave contribution is 0.52%, for a total of 0.63%. Employers may withhold from a covered employee’s wages the entire 0.11% contribution rate for family leave contribution and up to 0.208% for an employee’s medical leave contribution. Employers are responsible for directly paying the remaining 0.312% of medical leave contribution. For employers with fewer than 25 employees, the family leave contribution for 2023 is 0.11% and the medical leave contribution is 0.208% for a total of 0.318%. Employers with fewer than 25 covered individuals may also withhold 0.11% of eligible wages for the family leave contribution and 0.208% of eligible wages for the medical leave contribution.

If you have any questions about the content of this update, please contact us. We are pleased to assist employers with all matters related to PFML.

This update is provided for informational purposes only and should not be considered legal advice.

Massachusetts Legislature Amends Student Discipline Law

Starting November 8, 2022, Massachusetts schools must take additional steps to re-engage students before using suspension and expulsion as disciplinary measures. As part of An Act Addressing Barriers to Care for Mental Health, St. 2022, c. 177, § 29, the Massachusetts Legislature amended M.G.L. c. 71, §37H ¾(b) to include new language relevant to student discipline. Pursuant to those changes, before suspending or expelling students, schools must consider ways to re-engage the student and, in certain circumstances, implement alternative remedies.

Prior to the amendment, subsection (b) only required that the decision-maker “consider ways to re-engage the student in the learning process; and avoid using expulsion as a consequence until other remedies and consequences have been employed.” The amendment expands these requirements. As a result, before suspending or expelling a student, the decision-maker must employ alternative remedies in response to a specific incident and document their use and results. The alternative remedies required by the law include but are not limited to: (1) mediation; (2) conflict resolution; (3) restorative justice; and (4) collaborative problem solving.

The amendment provides for limited exceptions to these requirements where: (1) such remedies are unsuitable to the specific incident or are counter-productive; or (2) the student’s continued presence in school would pose a specific, documentable concern about the infliction of serious bodily injury or other serious harm upon another person while in school. School districts must document the facts which support either of these exceptions.

The school district must also implement school- or district-wide models to re-engage students in the learning process, such as positive behavioral interventions and support models or trauma sensitive learning models.  However, these models may not be considered as a direct response to specific incidents.

Since this amendment will take effect on November 8th, school districts should develop processes of implementing alternative remedies to discipline, prepare ways to re-engage students in the learning process, and assess how to document the use and results of alternative remedies as well as circumstances where alternative remedies may not be employed. School districts should also notify all superintendents, principals, headmasters, and anyone likely to act as a decision-maker in a student discipline hearing of these changes in the law. It should be kept in mind that this amendment does not apply to discipline imposed under G.L. c. 71, §37H or under G.L. c. 71, §37H ½.

If you have any questions on the content of this update, please contact us. We are pleased to assist public and private schools in all matters related to student discipline, as well as provide strategies in documenting new requirements under this law.

This update is provided for informational purposes only and should not be considered legal advice.

VDH Files Amicus Brief for M.A.S.C. in Appeal of Decision Sustaining Local Board’s Policy Barring Disruption During Public Comment Sessions

On November 2, 2022, the Supreme Judicial Court will hear oral argument in Barron, et al. v. Southborough Board of Selectmen, et al., No. SJC-13284. The case is an appeal from a Superior Court decision that rejected a challenge to a local select board’s enforcement of its policy against speech during the public comment session of its open meetings that disrupts the meeting. The plaintiffs claim that the policy violates their speech rights under Article 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

VDH attorney John Foskett has filed an amicus brief on behalf of the Massachusetts Association of School Committees. The brief urges the court to affirm the lower court’s decision; to hold that the public comment sessions during school committee open meetings are a “limited public forum”; and to decide that under analogous cases addressing the right of speech in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the challenged policy is lawful. The brief argues that so long as a policy is reasonable and viewpoint neutral and is targeted at disruption, the policy may bar speech that involves ad hominem attacks, vituperation, shouting, interrupting other speakers, and similar conduct. The brief argues that this result is consistent with the Open Meeting Law, G.L. c. 30A, §20(g), which authorizes the chairs of local boards and committees to control disruption of open meetings by speakers.

A decision by the court can be expected by December or thereafter.

Four VDH Attorneys Named 2022 Massachusetts Super Lawyers and Rising Stars

Robert D. Hillman and John Foskett have been named Massachusetts Super Lawyers for 2022 and Nicholas J. Dominello and Jennifer F. King have been named Massachusetts Rising Stars.  Super Lawyers is a rating service of outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high-degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. This selection process includes independent research, peer nominations and peer evaluations. Rising Stars are chosen by their peers as being among the top up-and-coming lawyers and must be 40 years old or younger, or in practice 10 years or less.

Massachusetts Announces 2023 Paid Family and Medical Leave Contribution Rates and Benefit Amounts

The Massachusetts Department of Family and Medical Leave recently announced changes to the employer contribution rates and benefit amounts under the Paid Family Medical Leave Act (PFMLA). Effective January 1, 2023, the contribution rate for employers with 25 or more covered individuals will be reduced to 0.63% of covered employees’ eligible wages from the current rate of 0.68%. Employers with fewer than 25 covered individuals will have a contribution rate of 0.318% of eligible wages, a reduction from the current rate of 0.344%.

For employers with 25 or more covered individuals, the 0.63% contribution rate is apportioned between family leave and medical leave, with 0.52% to medical leave and 0.11% to family leave. Employers may withhold from a covered employee’s wages the entire 0.11% contribution rate for family leave contribution and up to 0.208% for an employee’s medical leave contribution. Employers are responsible for directly paying the remaining 0.312% of medical leave contribution.

Employers with fewer than 25 covered individuals may also withhold 0.11% of eligible wages for the family leave contribution and 0.208% of eligible wages for the medical leave contribution.

Although contribution rates will decrease from 2022 to 2023, the maximum weekly wage a covered employee can receive while on paid family medical leave will increase to $1,129.82 per week in 2023 from $1,084.31 per week in 2022.

If you have any questions about the content of this update, please contact us. We are pleased to assist employers with all matters related to paid family medical leave.

This update is provided for informational purposes only and should not be considered legal advice.

SJC Holds that Certain Crimes Committed After Retirement Can Result in Pension Forfeiture

On September 6, 2022, the Supreme Judicial Court issued a decision in Mahan v. Boston Retirement Board, No. 13208 (2022), holding that the pension forfeiture provisions of G.L. c. 32, § 15(3) and (4) apply to an individual whose criminal activity occurs after the individual has retired from public service. The SJC’s conclusion means that criminal convictions involving an employee’s misappropriation of public funds and/or violation of the laws that apply to his office/position can result in the forfeiture of retirement benefits regardless of whether the individual is an active public employee at the time of the offense.

Mahan was a correction officer who, in August of 2000, sustained a knee injury while attempting to restrain an inmate involved in a fight. As a result of his injury, Mahan was initially unable to work and received accidental disability retirement effective in November 2003. Between 2003 and 2013, Mahan received a combination of workers’ compensation benefits, assault pay, and a disability retirement allowance. To demonstrate continued eligibility for the workers’ compensation benefits, Mahan certified every six months that he was not working. However, beginning in 2006, after his retirement and while completing certifications and collecting the benefits, he worked at a car dealership owned by his wife. After pleading guilty to one count of workers’ compensation fraud and one count of larceny, Mahan was ordered to pay over $300,000 in restitution to his former employer. Because of Mahan’s criminal convictions, the Boston Retirement Board then voted to revoke his retirement benefits pursuant to c. 32, § 15(3) and (4). Mahan appealed the decision, arguing that these sections did not apply to him since he did not commit his crimes until after he was retired and receiving benefits.

G.L. c. 32, § 15(3) stipulates that any “member” of the retirement system convicted of a criminal offense involving the funds of their public employer shall be ineligible to receive a retirement allowance until full restitution is made. § 15(4) makes any “member” convicted of a crime tied to their public office permanently ineligible for a retirement allowance. The SJC noted that G.L. c. 32, § 3 defines “member” to include both those who are currently employed as “members in service” and those who are “inactive” because they have retired and are receiving benefits. Consequently, the SJC concluded that the two forfeiture provisions apply to individuals who commit certain crimes after retirement as well as those who commit these crimes while actively serving as public employees.

The Mahan decision is important because it clarifies that retirees who commit crimes that fit the criteria in § 15 can forfeit their pension as a result, even if the criminal conduct did not occur until after retirement.

If you have any questions about the content of this update, please contact us. We are pleased to assist public and private employers with all matters related to retirement benefits.

This update is provided for informational purposes only and should not be considered legal advice.

SJC Upholds MIAA’s Decision That Fifth-Year Senior is Not Eligible for Athletic Participation

On August 29, 2022, the Supreme Judicial Court issued a decision in Abner v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Association, No. 13224 (2022). The court upheld a determination by the Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Association (“MIAA”) that a high school senior who had repeated his junior year and had played four prior years of high school athletics was ineligible for a fifth year. The SJC decided that courts should only overturn MIAA eligibility decisions that are “arbitrary and capricious”. Applying that standard, the SJC concluded that the MIAA’s denial of the request for an extra year of athletic eligibility was a valid application of its rules.

The student attended a public high school for three years and participated in football and basketball each year. During the football seasons the coach allegedly bullied the student, causing him to develop anxiety and depression. As a result, the student transferred to a private school. Based in part on struggles the student had with learning, the student repeated his junior year at the new private school and played football and basketball. Both the public and private schools attended by the student were members of the MIAA. Since the MIAA has a rule restricting student-athlete eligibility to four years, the student was ineligible to play for his senior season unless he received an eligibility waiver. The student requested a waiver and attached a letter from his therapist describing the role sports played in relieving the student’s anxiety and depression, but the MIAA denied the application. After the student obtained a preliminary injunction in the Superior Court, the MIAA appealed and the SJC exercised direct review.

Because the student had played both football and basketball during his senior year while the appeal was pending and had then graduated, he urged the court to dismiss the appeal because the case had become “moot”. The SJC disagreed because retroactive penalties could still be imposed on the school, meaning that it retained a “stake” in the outcome, and because similar challenges to MIAA eligibility determinations are “virtually certain” to be brought in the future. Moving to the merits of the appeal, the court held that, because the MIAA is treated as a state actor for legal purposes and enjoys administrative discretion to determine student-athlete eligibility, a reviewing court should examine a challenged eligibility decision only to determine whether the decision is arbitrary and capricious. Since this is a lenient standard, the SJC determined that the MIAA’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious because it addressed every factor in its eligibility rule and it was supported by evidence.

The Abner decision is important because it sets the standard of review for MIAA eligibility decisions. So long as school districts follow the eligibility rules of the MIAA for sports that are subject to MIAA jurisdiction or use rules that they are authorized to promulgate by the MIAA, it appears that application of those rules will be subject to the generous standard laid out in Abner.

If you have any questions about the content of this update, please contact us. We are pleased to assist public and private schools with all legal issues related to athletics, including eligibility determinations, student records, and participation waivers.

This update is provided for informational purposes only and should not be considered legal advice.

Follow Up: Statute Limits Impacts of SJC Decision that Payments Made in Lieu of Vacation Time Are Not Included in Pension Calculation

On August 4, 2022, Governor Baker signed into law an act that limits certain impacts of the Supreme Judicial Court’s recent decision in Joseph O’Leary v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board, No. 13229 (2022). The SJC concluded that payments made in lieu of vacation leave are not “regular compensation” for purposes of retirement calculations. The Legislature anticipated this result by amending General Laws c. 32 to ensure that certain employees continue to have these payments included in their retirement calculations. Still, employees who entered service recently and newly hired employees will not be able to have these payments included in their retirement calculations.

The Act, St. 2022, c. 147, adds a new section 106 to G.L. c. 32. For employees who are already retired and whose retirement benefits were calculated using amounts paid in lieu of vacation leave, the retirement allowance will remain the same and will continue to include such payments in regular compensation. For those employees who are not yet retired and who were in service as of May 1, 2018, payments made annually in lieu of vacation leave pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, individual employment contract, written benefits or personnel policy, or municipal plan or ordinance/bylaw will be considered “regular compensation” for retirement purposes. These payments will continue to be treated as regular compensation, even if made after May 1, 2018, so long as: (1) the employee was in service as of May 1, 2018; (2) the payments are made pursuant to a CBA or other employment contract, written benefits or personnel policy, or ordinance/bylaw/plan that was in effect as of May 1, 2018; (3) the employee consistently participated in a program available to all similarly situated employees; (4) the payments were not made only in the final 3 years of employment for a member who joined the system prior to April 2, 2012 or the final 5 years for a member who joined after April 2, 2012; and (5) the payments were not made as a result of providing notice of retirement.

For any employee who was not in service as of May 1, 2018, payments made in lieu of vacation are not included in “regular compensation” for retirement purposes. In other words, the amendment does not affect these employees and the recent SJC decision in O’Leary, which found that payments made in lieu of vacation are not included in retirement calculations, controls.

If you have any questions about the content of this update, please contact us.

This update is provided for informational purposes only and should not be considered legal advice.

SJC Concludes that Payments Made In Lieu of Vacation Time Are Not Included in Pension Calculation

On August 11, 2022, the Supreme Judicial Court issued a decision in Joseph O’Leary v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board, No. 13229 (2022), holding that payments made in lieu of unused, accrued vacation time are not “regular compensation” for the purpose of calculating a public employee’s retirement allowance under the Contributory Retirement Law, G.L. chapter 32. The SJC invalidated prior guidance from the Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission (PERAC), which many employees had relied on to argue that payment for unused vacation time should, under certain circumstances, be considered as regular compensation.

The employee was a police officer who, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, was eligible to convert up to ten days of vacation time every year into compensation.  He made this election every December and the compensation was paid biweekly in the next fiscal year. When the retirement board rejected his argument that these payments constituted “regular compensation” for purposes of calculating his retirement allowance, he filed an administrative law appeal which eventually made its way to the SJC.

The SJC applied the definition of “regular compensation” in G.L. c. 32, §1, i.e., “compensation received exclusively as wages [i.e., the base salary or other base compensation of an employee,] by an employee for services performed in the course of employment for his employer.” The court concluded that these payments are excluded from “regular compensation” because they are not “recurrent or repeated” but repeat only upon specific election by the employee during the election period, even if the employee has consistently made the election. The court also held that these payments are derived from salary enhancements or salary augmentation plans which will recur for a limited or definite term and are therefore explicitly excluded from the definition of “wages” in section 1 of the Law.

This decision effectively overrules an advisory memorandum that PERAC issued in 2012 to local retirement boards. PERAC had advised that payments for unused vacation time could be included in pension calculations if they met certain threshold requirements.

The O’Leary decision is important for employers because it defines which payments are included in calculating an employee’s retirement allowance. Employers should be aware that where employees have the option to elect to receive certain payments, those payments will not be used in determining the amount of the retirement allowance if the payments are “elective rather than naturally recurring”.

If you have any questions about the content of this update, please contact us. We are pleased to assist public employers who may be confronted with questions regarding the Law, including involuntary retirement applications, employers’ rights in the retirement process, and collective bargaining issues that may implicate the Law.

This update is provided for informational purposes only and should not be considered legal advice.

Massachusetts Appeals Court Clarifies The Correct Recipient of a Presentment Letter for Claims Against a Public School Under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act

On August 10, 2022, the Massachusetts Appeals Court issued a decision in John Doe v. Cambridge Public Schools, 21-P-877, dismissing an elementary school student’s complaint of negligent infliction of emotional distress because the student failed to meet the presentment requirement of the Massachusetts Tort Claim Act (the MTCA), G.L. c. 258, § 4, when he mailed a presentment letter to the school’s superintendent. The MTCA has a requirement that any tort claimed against a public employer must be presented to the employer’s “executive officer” before being brought in court. The Court’s decision concluded that for public school districts, the superintendent is not necessarily the correct “executive officer” for this purpose.

Doe involved the suspension of an elementary school student. In December of 2017, female students complained that certain unnamed male students were sharing photographs of naked women on their cellphones after school, while waiting for the bus. The plaintiff in Doe was singled out by the principal as the student responsible and was suspended even after the principal learned that the student was not in school on the day of the alleged incident and was not allowed to bring a cellphone to school. The school scheduled a readmission hearing for the student in early January 2018, but the meeting had to be rescheduled for the following day because the student was unable to leave his house due to extreme nervousness and fear of further disciplinary action. Following the suspension, the student sent a letter presenting a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under the MTCA to the superintendent and then brought a claim against the school district in state court.  The school district sought to dismiss the complaint based on improper presentment, which the Superior Court denied, resulting in the school district filing the instant appeal.

In its decision, the Appeals Court reasoned that the school district is not a legal entity wholly separate from the city. As such, the MTCA required the student to present his claim to the “executive officer” of the city, rather than the school. In the instant case, the proper recipient of the presentment letter would have been the mayor. Because the presentment letter was addressed to the improper recipient, the Appeals Court reversed the Superior Court order, and thereafter ordered the student’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress be dismissed.

This decision expands a procedural obstacle placed in front of those wishing to bring tort claims under the MTCA against public schools. Following the Doe decision, tort claims brought against public schools may be dismissed if they have not already been presented to the municipality’s mayor, manager, or another individual designated as executive in the city or town charter. While this decision could be appealed further to the Supreme Judicial Court, it has an immediate impact on MTCA claims against public schools.

If you have any questions about the application of this update, please contact us. We are pleased to assist public employers in the defense of MTCA claims.

This update is provided for informational purposes only and should not be considered legal advice.