On July 23, 2018 a federal judge in this district denied a defendant Town’s motion for summary judgment on a Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) claim brought by a former employee. The employee sued the Town and two supervisors alleging retaliation for taking FMLA leave to care for her ill spouse. The decision is instructive on pitfalls for employers where an employee has exercised FMLA rights.

During the majority of the plaintiff’s 25 years working for the Town’s Recreation Department she received positive reviews. In 2015, her husband became ill and the plaintiff informed her supervisor, the Assistant Town Manager, that she would need to attend appointments with her husband.  The Assistant Town Manager told the plaintiff to take all the time she needed, and informed the Town Manager of the situation.  Around this time, however, the Town observed that the plaintiff had failed to complete certain assignments, missed meetings, and played tennis during the Recreation Department’s business hours.

As the Town commenced an investigation into this alleged misconduct, the plaintiff requested intermittent FMLA leave to assist her husband. The Human Resources Director and Assistant Town Manager then informed the Town Manager that the plaintiff would be exercising her FMLA rights.  A week later, the Town demoted her. (While the Assistant Town Manager told the plaintiff it was because she could no longer trust her, a Recreation Department employee claimed that the Assistant Town Manager told him it was due to the time the plaintiff needed to attend to her husband’s illness.)  The Town and the plaintiff also entered into a Last Chance Agreement (“LCA”) which provided for termination in the event she engaged in misconduct.  After a series of poor interactions between the plaintiff and Town employees, the Assistant Town Manager notified her that she was being placed on paid administrative leave and likely to be terminated.  In lieu of termination, the plaintiff resigned.

Plaintiff sued, claiming that she was retaliated against for taking FMLA leave when the Town demoted her, imposed the LCA, and forced her to resign or face termination. A plaintiff claiming FMLA retaliation must first establish that: (1) she availed herself of a protected right under the FMLA; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal connection, i.e., that the employer took the adverse action because the employee exercised her rights.  If the plaintiff meets this requirement the employer must then articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action.  If the employer successfully articulates a reason, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.

The district judge ruled that the plaintiff had met her initial requirement because (1) she had availed herself of a protected right under the FMLA when she took time to assist her husband’s medical needs and requested FMLA paperwork; (2) she had suffered an adverse employment action when she was demoted, allegedly forced to sign the LCA, and forced out of her position; and (3) there was a causal connection where she was demoted just a week after formally requesting FMLA paperwork and the ultimate decision maker (the Town Manager) was presumed to be aware of the plaintiff’s need to take FMLA leave because the Assistant Town Manager’s knew of it.

The judge next found that the Town had articulated a non-discriminatory reason for its actions because there was evidence that the plaintiff had engaged in misconduct. The judge also ruled,  however, that the plaintiff had met her obligation of showing that the Town’s reason was a pretext because she had successfully worked for the Town for over two decades but her relationship with Town management only deteriorated after she had invoked her FMLA rights. The judge therefore ruled that there was sufficient evidence for the plaintiff to have a jury decide her claim.

This decision serves as an important reminder for employers that caution must be exercised when taking employment actions where the employee has asserted FMLA rights.  In most situations it will be wise to consult with an attorney in order to decide whether to take action and, if so, how to do it in a way which minimizes legal exposure.

If you have any questions regarding the content of this update, or any other questions regarding labor or employment law generally, please contact us.

This update is provided for informational purposes only and should not be considered legal advice.

The following is a summary of several key provisions of the new paid family and medical leave law. It is not intended to cover all aspects of the new law. This law is mandatory for all private sector employers effective January 1, 2019. Because it is a local option statute, public employers will not be subject to the law unless and until accepted by vote of the local legislative or governing body. Please note that certain provisions of the law go into effect on January 1, 2019, while other provisions go into effect on later dates through 2021. We will continue to publish updates on this topic once regulations are promulgated and as the various provisions of the law go into effect.

What the law does

Chapter 121 of the Acts of 2018 (“the law”) establishes a paid family and medical leave program in Massachusetts. Beginning January 1, 2021, Massachusetts employees will be able to take paid medical leave for their own serious health condition as well as paid family leave to bond with their child during the first 12 months after the child’s birth (or placement through the adoption/foster care process). Beginning July 1, 2021, employees will be able to take paid family leave to care for a family member with a serious health condition. The law also provides paid family and medical leave for employees who are in the armed forces or who have family members in the armed forces.

Employees will be entitled to take up to 12 weeks of paid family leave in a year and up to 20 weeks of paid medical leave in a year; however, the total amount of leave an employee may take in any given year (for family and medical leave combined) will be limited to 26 weeks. While on leave, employees will be paid a “weekly benefit amount” determined by the new Department of Family and Medical Leave.

Who the law affects

Like the 2015 earned sick time law, the new family and medical leave law is a local option statute. It automatically applies to all private employers in Massachusetts, but it will not apply to any municipality, district, political subdivision, or instrumentality of the commonwealth unless adopted by vote of the local legislative or governing body.

Public employers in municipalities that do not accept the law will continue to be subject to the provisions of the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and any existing medical/family/disability leave policies and collectively bargained agreements.

How the law works

The law establishes a new Department of Family and Medical Leave (“the department”). Beginning July 1, 2019, the department will begin to collect contributions from employees and employers with 25 or more employees. The Director of the department will set the contribution rate annually and contributions will be placed in the new “Family and Employment Security Trust Fund.” The Fund will be administered by the treasurer and receiver general.

In January 2021, when the leave entitlements begin to take effect, the department will be responsible for administering leave payments through a claims system.

The law requires employees to provide employers with at least 30 days’ notice of the anticipated start date of the leave, the expected duration of the leave, and the expected return-to-work date. While the department will handle the claims process, employers will be responsible for supplying information to the department such as information regarding an employee’s wages, earnings, and other employment information. Employers will face potential financial liability for failure to timely supply such information to the department.

Upon their return from leave, employees must be restored to the same status, pay, benefits, and seniority that they had when the leave began. The law prohibits retaliation by an employer against an employee for exercising their rights under the law. There will be a presumption of retaliation if an employer takes any adverse action against an employee during the employee’s leave or within six months after an employee returns from leave. The law also establishes a private right of action for violations of the law with a three-year statute of limitations. Employers found to have violated the law may be liable for treble damages for lost wages, benefits, and other remuneration, plus interest and attorneys’ fees.

Rolling Implementation

Even though many of the key provisions of the law do not go into effect until 2021, some provisions – such as the law’s posting and notice requirements – take effect on January 1, 2019.

Beginning January 1, 2019, employers will be required to post information about the law in a conspicuous place at each of the employer’s locations. Employers will also have 30 days to provide existing and new employees with written information about the law and obtain each employee’s written acknowledgment of receipt or refusal. Failure to adhere to the posting and notice requirements will subject employers to a fine of $50 per employee for the first violation and $300 per employee for each subsequent violation.

Additional aspects of the law take effect between 2019 and 2021. We will continue to post updates and reminders to our clients as these additional changes draw closer.

Interaction with Other Leaves

Massachusetts family and medical leave can run concurrently with parental leave and FMLA. Employers will not be permitted to require employees to exhaust their sick, vacation, or personal time prior to or while taking leave. If an employee’s collective bargaining agreement provides for greater payment than the statute, the employer will be required to pay the higher amount, although the time spent out on leave will still count against the statutory leave entitlement.

This update is provided for informational purposes only and should not be considered legal advice.

As pointed out in our June 27, 2018 Client Advisory, the Supreme Court released its decision yesterday in Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, U.S. No. 16-466 (2018), which held that a state statute which allows public sector unions to charge non-member employees an agency service fee for activities connected with their collective bargaining activities as exclusive representative violates the First Amendment rights of those non-members. In our advisory we stated that we would provide further analysis because Massachusetts has a statute – G.L. c. 150E, §2 – which contains a requirement similar to that in the Illinois statute which was invalidated by the Court.

Two significant issues for Massachusetts employers are raised by the Janus decision. First, many employers have been making deductions for service fees from the paychecks of employees who may not be members of any of the unions which represent its employees. Second, many of those same employers are parties to collective bargaining agreements which may have provisions premised on the Massachusetts statute.

In its opinion the Court requires that employees “clearly and affirmatively consent” before service fees may be deducted from their pay because they are waiving their First Amendment right.  Slip Op. at 48. This means that an employer must assure itself of two things – (1) that each employee has consented in writing to a deduction for service fees and (2) that the consent is obtained in a manner which reasonably informs the employee that it is voluntary. In cooperation with its bargaining units, the employer should therefore determine that these requirements are satisfied. Employers will also need to promptly revise payroll systems to reflect this decision.

Regarding collective bargaining provisions, the Court did not directly address those. The collective bargaining agreement involved in Janus did, however, require payment of a service fee, slip op. at 5; the Court stated its holding in broad terms – “public-sector agency-fee arrangements are unconstitutional”, id. at 6 [emphasis added]; and it referred to a collective bargaining provision which “is found to be unlawful”, id. at 46. Given this, employers should review their agreements for language which may have to be revised through discussions with their unions. In our opinion these changes should not be subject to decision or impact bargaining requirements because they do not involve the employer’s choice to exercise a non-delegable managerial right. Instead, the Court has given employers no option by deciding that such arrangements violate the law regarding employees’ First Amendment rights.

The Court indicated that unions may have options to avoid so-called “free rider” abuses, specifically mentioning the possibility of giving non-members the choice of paying a fee for union representation in disciplinary proceedings or being denied the service. Slip Op. at 17. That sort of arrangement is between the union and the employee and should not directly involve the employer.

These issues need to be worked through carefully. We are reviewing the collective bargaining agreements between our clients and their unions to determine which may need revision. In addition, we are preparing a draft template for employees to sign when indicating their decision whether or not to authorize payroll deductions for dues or service fees.  The template can be discussed with the respective unions.

In the interim, if you have any questions please contact any one of our attorneys.

This update is provided for informational purposes only and should not be considered legal advice.

 

On June 5, 2018, a Middlesex Superior Court judge issued an order enjoining the Natick School Committee from enforcing its public speak policy during meetings. While this order is not a final decision in the case and is binding only on the parties to that lawsuit, it may carry significance for other districts which have in place similar public comment rules for School Committee meetings.

The lawsuit was brought by parents of two unrelated former Natick students. They alleged that the Committee, its chair, and the interim Superintendent unconstitutionally restricted their speech during the “public speak” portion of Committee meetings. The plaintiffs requested, among other things, a preliminary injunction to prevent the school committee from enforcing its public speak policy and an order declaring that the school committee’s policy is unconstitutional.

The Committee’s policy bans (1) “improper” conduct and “defamatory” or “abusive” remarks and (2) complaints about individual school personnel or any member of the school community during the public speak period. These provisions are identical to the MASC model policy BEDH. The Committee invoked the policy during a January 2018 meeting, when one parent made comments during public speak that her child had been bullied. The Committee suspended the meeting and had the parent removed, later issuing her a no trespass order prohibiting her from attending the area where Committee meetings are held. The Committee later invoked the policy against the second parent in February and March 2018, after she commented during public speak that Natick Public Schools had created a retaliatory and hostile climate. The Committee then amended its policy to bar “vulgar language and ideas” and to authorize the Chair to stop a speaker if he/she becomes “disruptive as defined by the chair.”

The court applied the standard test to evaluate the plaintiffs’ request for an injunction, focusing on the most important, i.e., a likelihood of success on the merits. Under applicable First Amendment precedent (which the court applied to the plaintiffs’ claim under the cognate Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provision, Article 16), public bodies may establish “limited public forums,” which may be dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects. The court stated that the body may always impose “reasonable” rules which are “viewpoint neutral” for limited public forums. If, however, the rules are based on the content of the speech, they can only be upheld if they further a “compelling interest” and are “narrowly tailored” to serve that interest.

The court recognized that school committees have a compelling interest in protecting student and staff privacy, as well as in conducting orderly and efficient meetings. However, the court found that the committee’s policy actually restricted speech based on the viewpoint of the speaker and was “aimed to prohibit certain speech that is critical of the Natick Public Schools.” The policy’s prohibitions on improper, vulgar, and disruptive remarks vested too much discretion in the chair to silence speakers based on the particular views they expressed. Thus, the policy was overbroad. The court also noted that well-established case law in Massachusetts would invalidate the portion of the policy prohibiting “defamation” during public speak.

The Committee had argued that the Open Meeting Law gives public body chairs the authority to prohibit meeting disruptions, and that such authority was properly exercised in the case. The court disagreed, calling into question the possibility that the exercise of such authority might conflict with speakers’ state and federal free speech rights. The court made an interesting distinction between the portion of a meeting devoted to agenda items and the portion devoted to public speak. During discussion on agenda items, the chair can exercise authority over the meeting to prohibit a speaker from straying off topic or otherwise disturbing the order and efficiency of the meeting. The chair’s authority during the public comment portion, on the other hand, is far more limited. In other words, speech that is “disruptive” during discussion of agenda items is not necessarily “disruptive” during public speak. In this case, because the plaintiffs’ speech was school-related and delivered “in a calm manner” during public speak, the court found that it was not “disruptive”. Therefore, the chair did not have authority under the Open Meeting Law to restrict the speech.

Having found a likelihood of success, the court briefly assessed the other required elements for a preliminary injunction and ruled that they were satisfied. In its injunction order, however, the court recognized the sensitive nature of subject matters which might be discussed at Committee meetings and the need to protect the privacy of students and staff. The court therefore included an exception which bars naming or “otherwise identifying” individual staff or students during the public speak portion of meetings. It also stated that this exception is “for the purposes of temporary injunctive relief only.” Unfortunately, the court failed to expound on the precise meaning or parameters of this exception.

Although the court’s order is not “final” a provision in the General Laws authorizes an appeal to the Appeals Court from an interlocutory order granting an injunction, which would have to be filed within 30 days. Since the order has just been entered, we have no information as to whether the Committee intends to appeal. Given that the court’s analysis may have collateral consequences regarding standard public speak policies used by school committees and other municipal boards across the Commonwealth, we intend to monitor this case closely.

If you have questions about this decision, or about school law generally, please contact any of our attorneys.

This update is provided for informational purposes only and should not be considered legal advice.