In a “Dear Colleague” letter dated July 22, 2025, the U.S. Department of Education (“DOE”) issued guidance on the use of federal grant funds to improve education outcomes using artificial intelligence (“AI”).  The letter articulates the DOE’s commitment to educational excellence, innovation, and opportunity for every learner and encourages federal grantees to explore how AI can enhance teaching and learning, expand access, and support teachers without replacing the critical role played by educators in the American school system.

The letter affirms that AI may be used so long as the uses are allowable under existing federal education programs and align with applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.  The first applicable guidance addresses the allowable uses of funds and grants for instructional materials. These uses include: (1) development or procurement of AI-powered instructional tools that adapt to learner needs in real time; (2) expansion of access to high-quality, personalized learning materials across all subjects, grade levels, and learning environments; and (3) training of educators, providers, and families to use AI tools effectively and responsibly.

The second set of guidelines authorize the use of funds and grants for high-impact tutoring options, such as: (1) intelligent tutoring systems that provide individualized academic support with real-time assessment; (2) hybrid models where human tutors are complemented by AI-based learning platforms; and (3) diagnostic and scheduling tools that use AI to match learners with tutoring services based on need.

The final category outlines authorized uses of AI for college and/or career pathway exploration, advising, and navigation, including: (1) platforms that leverage AI to help students identify career interests, explore pathways, and make informed choices; (2) virtual advising systems that guide students through course planning, financial aid, and transitions to postsecondary education or careers; and (3) predictive models that support educators in identifying students in need of additional advising or support services.

The letter affirms “principles for responsible use” involving AI-related educational initiatives. Those initiatives must be educator-led, ethical, accessible, transparent, explainable, and data-protective; should support teachers, providers, tutors, advisors, and education leaders and that educators should help students navigate AI to evaluate validity and understand the appropriate use of AI; should ensure that all AI tools or systems utilized in the education system are accessible for those who require digital accessibility accommodations; and should be transparent for stakeholders, especially parents, so that they understand how the systems function and can participate meaningfully in decisions about the adoption/development of new technologies in the classroom.  Finally, the letter reminds school districts that all AI systems must comply with federal privacy laws including the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).

In the context of federal funding and grants, the DOE letter outlines how school districts may utilize those funds and grants regarding AI.  Other than authorizing recipients for training families to “use AI tools effectively and responsibly”, it does not explicitly address how school districts may respond to incidents of student conduct involving their use of AI to generate classroom work.  That is the subject of ongoing development by school districts. Last Fall, the United States District Court in Massachusetts rejected a claim for an injunction based on allegations that a school district had violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause when it penalized a student for cheating by submitting AI-generated material as his own work.  Harris v. Adams, 757 F. Supp. 3d 111 (D. Mass. 2024).

We are pleased to advise Massachusetts school districts on issues related to the application of federal and state funding and grants, as well as on the proper role of AI in schools.

This update is provided for informational purposes only and should not be considered legal advice.

On June 12, 2025 the Supreme Court issued an important decision deciding the standard of proof a student/family must in order to establish a claim for damages under the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) or under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act alleging that they have been unlawfully denied educational services. In A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent School Dist. No. 279, No. 24-249 (June 12, 2025), the Court held that these educational services claims should be subject to the same standards that apply to other disability discrimination claims – “deliberate indifference” by the school – and are not subject to a heightened standard requiring proof that the school acted with “bad faith or gross misjudgment”.

A.J.T. is a teenage girl who suffers from a rare form of epilepsy that severely limits her physical and cognitive functioning. She requires assistance with everyday tasks like walking and toileting and suffers from seizures throughout the day. Her seizures are so frequent in the morning that she can’t attend school before noon; however, she is alert and able to learn from noon to about 6 p.m.

For the first few years of her schooling, A.J.T.’s parents and educators accommodated her condition by allowing her to avoid activities before midday and to receive evening instruction at home. A.J.T. moved to Minnesota in 2015 and enrolled in the Osseo Area Public Schools. Osseo denied her parents’ accommodation request that under A.J.T.’s IEP she receive evening instruction. After Osseo proposed that the length of A.J.T.’s school day be reduced further A.J.T.’s parents filed a claim alleging that the school’s decision denied A.J.T. a free appropriate public education under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C., § 1400. An administrative law judge determined that the District had violated the IDEA and the District Court and Court of Appeals each affirmed this decision.

A.J.T. and her parents then sued Osseo for damages alleging violations of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The District Court entered summary judgment against them after ruling that they had failed to satisfy a standard requiring “bad faith or gross misjudgement” and the Court of Appeal affirmed.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that ADA and Section 504 damages claims based on denial of educational services are subject to the same standards that apply in other disability discrimination cases. The Court reasoned that there was no language in either the ADA or Section 504 suggesting that these claims are subject to a different and more demanding level of proof.

The Court pointed to the substantive provisions of both Title II and Section 504, which by their plain terms, apply to “qualified individual[s]” with disabilities. The Court’s analysis found there is no textual indication that the protections of either disability discrimination statute apply with lesser force to certain qualified individuals bringing certain kinds of claims. In other words, the law does not distinguish based on the context in which a claim is brought under either statute.

The Court further explained that there also is nothing in the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §1415(l), which states that it “shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the ADA, title V of the Rehabilitation Act, including §504, or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under the IDEA, the IDEA’s administrative procedures shall first be exhausted.” The Court stated that the plain text of §1415(l) makes it clear that a plaintiff who seeks relief available under the IDEA is also entitled to independent ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims for damages.

In summary, where a school district is found to have violated a student’s right to receive educational services under IDEA, a claim for damages under the ADA or Section 504 is subject to the same standard of “deliberate indifference” as applies to other ADA and 504 discrimination claims.

This case is simply another illustration of the care which is required by federal law of school officials in addressing the educational services needs of students with disabilities and the potential consequences of not doing so.

We are pleased to provide legal guidance to school districts in this highly nuanced and complex area of the law.

This update is provided for informational purposes only and should not be considered legal advice.

The Supreme Judicial Court has effectively reversed an Appeals Court decision regarding retaliation claims under G.L. chapter 150E that was issued literally one year earlier to the day.

In City of Newton v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board (“CERB”), 104 Mass.App.Ct. 203 (2024), the Appeals Court had reversed a decision by the CERB. That decision, in turn, had reversed a DLR hearing officer’s ruling regarding the three-stage burden shifting test that applies to a charge of unlawful retaliation for the exercise of rights protected by chapter 150E where the claim relies on circumstantial evidence. The charge was based on the unilateral transfer of a police officer from the day shift to the night shift, allegedly in retaliation for union activities. The hearing officer ruled that the employee had failed to meet his third stage burden of proof – that “but for” his union activities the officer would not have been transferred – after finding that the City had rebutted the officer’s case at the second stage with evidence of poor work performance.[1]

The Appeals Court reversed the CERB’s decision regarding the first stage requirement that the charging party show an “adverse action” affecting the employee. It did so by ruling that where the officer received a pay increase under the collective bargaining agreement as a result of the transfer, there was no “adverse action” as required. While unnecessary to its decision the court also held that the City-employer as a matter of law had met its second stage burden of showing a legitimate/non-pretextual reason for the transfer. The court’s ruling was based on evidence that the officer had a documented record of an unprofessional altercation with a supervisor and prior noncompliance with protocols, as well as on the hearing officer’s decision to credit the testimony of the investigating officer and the lack of evidence of a retaliatory motive.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for further appellate review. In City of Newton v. CERB, No. SJC-13655 (May 22, 2025) the court has affirmed the CERB and effectively reversed the Appeals Court’s decision. It held that, measured by the “substantial evidence” test, the Appeals Court was required to defer to the CERB’s evaluation of the three stages even though a contrary decision might also “find[] support in the administrative record”.

Applying this standard of review, the court held that the CERB was not obligated to rule that the officer failed to show an adverse action at the first stage simply because his transfer to the night shift resulted in a pay increase under the City’s applicable agreement with the officer’s union. Agreeing that “one factor” in the assessment might be the employer’s compliance with an agreement and the resulting benefit of a pay increase, the court observed that other evidence showed disadvantages in a transfer to the night shift regarding time off and schedule irregularity. The court decided that the CERB plausibly could determine that this was enough to meet the officer’s burden of showing an “adverse action” at the first stage. It also rejected the City’s argument that the officer’s poor performance record mandated a conclusion that he had not satisfied his burden at the first stage, because the charging party is not required “to prove a good work record”.[2]

Moving to the second stage requirement that the employer produce evidence of a legitimate reason for the decision, the court held that the CERB properly determined that the City had not satisfied the employer’s burden at this stage. Again applying the “substantial evidence” test for judicial review, the court found that the City presented no evidence that it took the officer’s prior performance into account when it made the transfer decision and that the CERB properly could find a failure to meet the second stage burden.

This ruling is instructive regarding the standard under which the courts review an agency’s assessment of the three-stage burden shifting test for chapter 150E retaliation claims based on circumstantial evidence. That includes judicial deference to the agency’s latitude in evaluating the evidence at each stage. It also provides guidance as to how a retaliation case can be defended and argued at a hearing.

Obviously, these cases are highly dependent on their specific facts and legal advice should be sought in assessing any given claim.

If you have any questions about the content of this update, please contact us. We are pleased to assist public employers with all issues related to the collective bargaining relationship under chapter 150E.

 

 

[1] The hearing officer had found that the officer met his first-stage burden of showing an adverse action but that the City had rebutted this at the second stage by showing a poor work record. After both parties appealed to the CERB, it affirmed the hearing officer’s first stage ruling but reversed her second stage ruling.

[2] The Appeals Court had reached the same conclusion regarding this argument.

 

 

This update is provided for informational purposes only and should not be considered legal advice.