Federal Court Clarifies When Contract Negotiations May Establish a “Property Right” in Employment That is Protected by the Due Process Clause

On July 14, 2025 the United States District Court of Massachusetts issued a decision that clarifies past rulings holding that public employees in particular circumstances have a “property right” in their employment under the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural due process guarantee. The plaintiff sued the City of Easthampton, the Easthampton School Committee, several individual Committee members, and the City’s Mayor. The complaint alleged several claims based on the Committee’s refusal to hire the plaintiff as Superintendent of Schools, including one based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

In February 2023, the plaintiff had been interviewed by the School Committee for the job and then voted to offer the job to him. The plaintiff was informed of the Committee’s decision; was told that the position had a yearly salary of $151,000; and was informed that the contract would be for a period of three years. The plaintiff verbally indicated that he would accept the job, and the Committee responded that it would send him a written employment contract with minor details to be further negotiated.

A proposed contract was emailed to the plaintiff the following day by a School Committee member’s assistant and he responded to the email by addressing the recipients as “Ladies.” His email requested changes related to compensation, vacation, and sick time.

During its discussion of his response, members asserted that the plaintiff’s use of “Ladies” in his email was “unprofessional and dismissive.” A Committee member added that she was “insulted” and “terrified of [Plaintiff’s] behavior” and suggested that the Committee should rescind the employment offer as opposed to having to go through a termination procedure at a later date. The Committee voted five to one (with one abstention) to rescind the decision to hire the plaintiff. He was told that his use of the term “Ladies” was unprofessional and dismissive, and constituted a microaggression. Although he apologized, he was informed that a vote had already been taken and that he would not be hired.

In the lawsuit the defendants filed a motion to dismiss and the court addressed the Due Process claim. Applying the lenient standard for a plaintiff at the pleadings stage, the court assumed that the alleged facts were true. It also took into account the Committee’s meeting minutes because they are a matter of public record, were fairly incorporated into the complaint, and were produced in their entirety by the defendants as attachments to their motion.

The court noted that the plaintiff’s Due Process claim requires that he establish that (1) he was deprived of a protected property interest under State law; and (2) the deprivation occurred without adequate procedural due process. While a simple breach of contract does not amount to an unconstitutional deprivation, in the context of public employment an employee may possess a property interest in continued employment that is created by contract. The court ruled, however, that the contract did not yet exist. The plaintiff had argued that although he had not signed the employment contract that was sent to him, his ensuing communications with the Committee constituted a counteroffer that created a valid contract. The court noted that under Massachusetts law a counteroffer can constitute an executed agreement if all material or essential terms of the employment contract are agreed to by both parties but that the parties must have progressed “beyond the stage of imperfect negotiation.” Because they had not yet agreed on the material terms the court decided that a valid contract was never created. It emphasized that the plaintiff’s requested salary increases actually showed that the agreement’s most essential term – compensation – had not yet been established and that his email was insufficient to create an enforceable contract.

The court further pointed to established Massachusetts policy that a party seeking to enforce a contract with a governmental entity must comply with statutory contracting requirements. It observed that G.L. c. 71 §§ 41 and 59 require that the School Committee fix the superintendent’s salary and formally offer an approved contract.

The Court therefore dismissed the Due Process claim. Because the other claims were brought under Massachusetts state law and were subject to the federal court’s discretionary supplemental jurisdiction, it dismissed those without prejudice to their being re-filed in State court should the plaintiff choose.

While this decision is highly fact-specific, it illustrates the care with which public employers should carry on contract negotiations with non-union employees.

We are pleased to represent public employers in all aspects of entering into and enforcing employment contracts.

This update is provided for informational purposes only and should not be considered legal advice.